Motor Imagery (in order to differentiate with other abbreviations we use the term IM) has originally been thought to only involve secondary motor areas associated with the 'cognitive' aspects or with the concept of a movement but not motor areas associated with their execution. The most controversial results with respect to this issue have been published on activation of the primary motor cortex (M1). Many methodological problems had to be solved to allow an answer to activation of M1 in IM. In the last years, several new approaches have been put forward in this field of cognitive neuroscience which will be introduced in this review. In the meantime, a preliminary conclusion will be drawn answering the question on M1 involvement in IM.
activation of the primary motor cortex (M1). Many methodological problems had to be solved to allow an answer to activation of M1 in IM. In the last years, several new approaches have been put forward in this field of cognitive neuroscience which will be introduced in this review. In the meantime, a preliminary conclusion will be drawn answering the question on M1 involvement in IM.
The functional equivalence between motor imagery and motor execution
Motor imagery (IM) represents the result of consciously accessing the intention for a movement usually performed unconsciously during movement preparation (Jeannerod 1994; 1995) . Conscious IM and unconscious motor preparation share common mechanisms and are functionally equivalent processes. According to these considerations, it is not surprising that movement execution (ME) and IM reveal a high overlap of active brain regions. This has been convincingly demonstrated by imaging studies in the last 15 years. We have already learnt about these overlapping networks in the previous chapter ("Neural basis of topographic representations in human: a review of neuroimaging studies") and we will now focus on the contribution of the primary motor cortex to IM. The contribution of the contralateral primary motor cortex (cM1) to IM points to a basic understanding of the functional organization of the motor system. If cM1 would be a purely related to execution, no activity would be expected during IM, or if so, it should be due to undetected execution during IM. On the other hand: if M1 is active during IM although any movement execution is avoided, the concept of our understanding of the function of M1 during movement preparation and execution will drastically change. We already have good reasons to change this concept of the primary motor cortex, since neurons in M1 do not only code for mere movement execution but code for differences in movement complexity (Lotze et al., 2000) and they do have an important role for motor learning, which has been demonstrated by training associated changes in M1-recruitment which go along with improvements of performance (Karni et al. 1995; Lotze et al., 2003) .
The Relation between Motor Execution and Imagination
James (1890) and Jacobsen (1930) described that the mental image of a movement is always followed by discharges of its target muscles. In contrast, recent scientific approaches to IM try to exclude any motor execution. By inhibiting the execution of a movement, a conscious access to motor preparation is possible (Jeannerod, 1994) .
Parallels on the physiological basis between executing a movement and imagining it will be discussed in detail in other chapters of this book. Roughly, early work on imagery nicely demonstrates essentials of this issue: during imagined weight lifting, the forearm muscles show a linear increase of amplitudes of EMG-recordings with magnitude of weight (Shaw, 1940) . Since the autonomous nerve system cannot be directly modulated on a voluntary basis, the immediately observed changes of heart rate (32 to 50% above rest) during imagined foot movements, the increases in CO2-pressure and in respiration frequency (Decety et al. 1991; Decety et al. 1993 , Wuyam et al., 1995 may probably be grounded within a cerebral process as a part of motor programming. In a recent paper on kinaesthetically and visually imagined finger sequences, Guillot et al. (2008) used skin conductance responses (SCR) during imagined and executed movements to help separating good from bad motor imagers. Good imagers show a task-related increase in SCR during IM and a decrease during rest. Decety et al. (1996) proposed that during imagined activities, a significant portion of the observed increase in autonomic response is of central origin. The authors interpreted this as though the mind deludes the body into believing that some movements are being executed. Additionally, subjective rating of the mental effort to imagine a task correlates with the amount of force needed for task execution.
Executed and imagined writing of the same letters, independently of the hand used, or executed and imagined walking of the same distances show the same duration (Decety & Michel, 1989; Bakker et al., 2008) . If the task is more difficult, e.g., by carrying a heavy load, the subjects tend to overestimate the duration of IM. Fitt's law (Fitts, 1954) which states that more difficult movements take more time to be executed than easier ones also applies to imagined movements (Decety, 1996; Decety & Jeannerod, 1996 , Maruff et al., 1999 . The validity of Fitt's law can therefore be used to distinguish between subjects who are able to imagine the task kinaesthetically and those who do not. Visual imagery of walking on a thin line, for instance, is not delayed in contrast to imagery of walking on a brad comfortable path.
There is a significant delay in kinaesthetically imagination for the thin line walk, however, when compared to the broad path (Bakker et al., 2008) . Further detailed investigations on durations of imagined movements also revealed differences compared with executed movements. Guillot and Collet reviewed the durations of mentally simulated movements and concluded that when athletes simulate only dynamic phases of movement or perform IM just before competing, environmental and time constraints lead to an underestimation of actual duration. Conversely, complex attention-demanding movements take longer to imagine (Guillot & Collet, 2005b) . Furthermore, it is essential to include the vividness of the imagination into the considerations of mental accuracy.
In line with previous assumptions, the process of imagination is not fully dependent on the ability to execute a movement but rather depends on central processing mechanisms.
Compared to healthy controls, patients with lesions of the motor cortex and patients with Parkinson's disease (Dominey et al., 1995) show decreased movement velocity during motor execution (ME) and IM. Patients with incomplete spinal lesions only show prolonged duration of ME but same durations of IM (Decety & Boisson, 1990) . Most interestingly after complete peripheral deafferentation due to complete spinal cord injury or due to peripheral nerve lesion, activation in the primary motor cortex is even enhanced (Lotze et al., 2001; Alkadhi et al., 2005; Lotze et al., 2006) . This finding indicates that M1 is accessible by IM even after years of deafferentation and deefferentation.
Differences between IM and ME
The lack of execution of the task Scientific approaches to imagery are different from those in applied fields. For athletes and musicians, a perfect avoidance of motor execution during IM is not necessarily important and some tension or even movement of the target muscles during IM is tolerable. Some athletes even report that bringing their body in a position similar to the motor task and moving slightly helps them to generate a vivid motor image. In order to clearly separate IM from ME from a scientific viewpoint, it is essential to avoid any motor activity during IM. Therefore, cortical neuronal assemblies only involved in mere motor execution (if there are some) should not be involved in IM. We will deal with issues in controlling avoidance of motor execution during IM in the methodological section of this chapter.
The lack of somatosensory feedback
Interacting with the environment is always associated with sensory input from changes of body position and dynamics (proprioceptive) as well as from objects in the external world transmitted by different sensory modalities (exteroceptive). The motor system is especially dependent on feedback by somatosensory inputs. Anatomically, the somatosensory system is tightly connected to the primary motor cortex via U-fibres. If there is no interaction with an external object, this special type of somatosensory input is lacking. It has to be mentioned that the sensorimotor guidance of movement is predominantly coordinated by the ipsilateral anterior hemisphere of the cerebellum (Gao et al., 1996) . Therefore, it is not astonishing that some studies on IM implementing careful normalization of cerebellar anatomy demonstrated that IM involves different structures within the cerebellar hemisphere than ME does (Lotze et al., 1999 ).
In the visual or auditory modality, the recruitment of primary areas during imagination has been shown to be highly correlated with the vividness of imagery (Cui et al., 2007; Kraemer et al. 2005) . In contrast, there are no explicit reports on vivid somatosensory imagery tasks.
Some studies, however, demonstrated somatosensory activation during vivid IM (Stippich et al., 2002) , even after deafferentation (Lotze et al., 2001) .
Methodological issues

What is the primary motor cortex?
It is important to know that the assignment of cortical areas to M1 is based on different levels.
Some authors use anatomical, others functional, and others cytoarchitectural assignments.
Roughly, many studies approximated M1 to the precentral gyrus. This is increasingly wrong for the more ventral parts of the precentral gyrus. In an early fMRI experiment, we used individual anatomic masks to separate activation in the precentral gyrus and compared number of activated voxel in this area to a reference area during ME and IM (Lotze et al., 1999) .
TMS studies define M1 functionally: the area below the scalp where maximal motor-evoked potentials of a target muscle can be elicited is declared as M1. Cytoarchitectural probability maps are now available as masks for the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)-and the Talairach space (Eickhoff et al., 2005; . These masks allow to use cytoarchitectural maps for the identification of the M1. However, spatial impreciseness due to the normalization process necessary for the overlay of these masks are still an issue when applying this method. There is a further subdivision of BA4: the dorsal bank of M1 is subdivided into an anterior area (Brodmann´s area: BA 4a), closely connected to premotor areas and a more posterior area (BA 4p). Both areas contain different finger representations (Geyer et al., 1996) . Whereas area 4a is thought to be predominantly related to motorexecutive aspects, BA 4p is modulated by attention during movement execution (Binkofski et al, 2002) . In a very recent paper, Sharma et al. (2008) elegantly demonstrated how informative it is to use probability maps to highlight the involvement of M1 in IM. The authors found an involvement of both BA 4a and 4p in IM of a finger-to-thumb opposition task. Area 4p activation, however, was more robust and similar to executed movement (see Figure 1 ).
Results on primary motor cortex activation during imagery
A direct comparison of ME minus IM during simple movements revealed significant differences in the cM1 (Stephan et al., 1995) and the ipsilateral anterior cerebellar hemisphere (Nair et al., 2003) and also during executed and imagined left hand play of a violin piece (Lotze et al., 2003) . By using the precentral gyrus as an individual anatomical mask, the problem of false attribution of areas into neighbouring anatomical structures by normalization (which is definitely more than 1 cm in imaging studies) can be avoided. Early fMRI studies which applied this method described approximately 50% BOLD-magnitude during IM compared to ME (Porro et al., 1996; Lotze et al., 1999) . This 50% reduced activation magnitude might lead to the impression that there is no M1-activation during imagery tasks when highly conservative thresholds are applied (FWE-correction for false positive responses in whole brain volume, random effects statistics).
One way of verifying that a structure is not involved in a task is to compare its activation with a region definitely not involved. If activation in M1 is statistically increased in comparison to such a reference region, activation in M1 will most probably be associated with task performance. Unfortunately, imaging studies with PET and fMRI only offer correlative data. Therefore, it is impossible by this method to definitely decide whether M1 is necessary for IM. Causal relationships can be revealed by TMS-jamming, which applies a functional lesion in the region of interest (Lotze et al., 2006) . Several fMRI studies did not see significant activation in M1 during IM (Binkofski, 2000 , Gerardin et al., 2000 Boecker et al., 20002; Naito et al., 2002) . None of these studies employed appropriate behavioural measurements. In addition, the statistical power for detecting a decreased M1 contribution to IM was too low. In fact, direct cellular recording in primates during IM of a prehensile task suggests that M1 is directly involved in encoding of directional information (Georgopopoulos et al., 1989) . Therefore, more complex motor tasks are more likely to induce M1 activation during IM. This assumption is in line with findings of Dechent and Frahm who reported an initial activation in M1 in 5 out of 6 subjects, decreasing over longer imagery periods (Dechent & Frahm, 2003) . Additionally, Kristeva and colleagues (2003), using imagery of playing a violin, demonstrated in an EEG study that muscle activation can be detected during the initial phase of imagery. Nevertheless, it can not be completely excluded that an initial M1 activation observed in the Dechent and Frahm study was associated with short EMG-activity in the target muscles as this was not controlled for. Sharma et al. (2008) postulated that since spatial encoding of a movement precedes execution, it is plausible that methods with higher temporal resolution show a contribution of M1 in IM.
By using TMS, excitability changes over M1 during IM have been described. A TMS study by Fadiga and colleagues demonstrated that IM results only in increased excitability of the muscle groups involved in the IM task but not in muscles not involved (Fadiga et al., 1998 ).
Some authors even described a somatotopic representation of the movements imagined in the sensorimotor cortex (Stippich et al., 2002; Ehrsson et al., 2003; Szameitat et al., 2007 , Orr et al., 2008 . Unfortunately, all these studies lack objective control of avoidance of actual execution during the IM task.
It is interesting to note that damage of the precentral gyrus after stroke does not result in a decrease of personal ratings of IM vividness (Sirigu et al., 1995) . Therefore, during IM, the precentral gyrus seems to be activated in the same neuronal assemblies which are associated with ME but the intactness of these neurons are not essential for a personal feeling of vividness of IM. It might be interesting to correlate vividness ratings with functional imaging maps during IM to discover areas associated with the personally felt intensity of IM vividness.
Although many studies demonstrated that kinaesthetic imagery is associated with M1 activation, most of them could not see any significant lateralization within M1 to the contralateral hemisphere (see also Guilliot et al., 2008a) . For ME it has been shown for several times, that the simpler the executed movement, the clearer the lateralization (e.g., Lotze et al., 2000) . The same might be true for IM: whereas kinaesthetic imagery of complex movements did not show relevant lateralization (Guillot et al., 2008a) , it has been described for IM of simple hand movements (Michelon et al., 2006; Pfurtscheller et al., 1999) .
The issue of motor execution control during scanning
Several earlier studies, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), reported cM1 activation during IM (Leonardo et al., 1995; Sabbah et al., 1995; Porro et al., 1996 , Roth et al., 1996 Lotze et al., 1999; Gerardin et al., 2000; Nair et al., 2003; Stippich et al., 2002; Ehrsson et al., 2003; Kutz-Buschbeck et al., 2003; Szameitat et al., 2007; Guillot et al., 2008; Orr et al., 2008; Munzert et al., 2008) . Most of them could not control for possible muscle discharges during scanning. Some fMRI studies used EMG-monitoring during IM prior to scanning and demonstrated that this was negligible compared to EMG amplitudes during ME (Leonardo et al., 1995; Roth et al., 1996; Lotze et al., 1999; Gerardin et al., 2000; Lafleur et al., 2002) . However, when elicited by different muscle contraction types, this residual activity has been shown to be specific to the content of the imagined contraction (see notably Guillot et al., 2007) . Only very recent studies were able to control for avoidance of movement execution with an artefact reduction of EMG during fMRI scanning (Bakker et al., 2008) . One criticism on these studies is that marginal EMG activity might nonetheless be detected after artefact reduction of EMG signals from the scanner artefacts. Systems which are capable to deal with these artefacts (if the electrodes are not moved in the magnetic field) are available by now (see Sehm et al., 2008) .
Another possibility might be the detection of movement parameters itself. This can be accomplished by video camera capture of the respective limb followed by a standardized evaluation of the data. A more elegant method is the detection of movements by sensors affixed to the to-be-imagined limb. This can be achieved with a virtual reality glove equipped with optic fibre sensors. In a very recent paper Sharma et al. (2008) used a MRI-compatible glove equipped with movement sensors. Although no single muscle movements can be avoided, any slight movement of the hand and a finger is detectible and the session of investigation with any movement execution can be excluded from group analysis.
When using methods such as Magnetoencephalography (MEG), PET, or TMS, electromyographic activities during imagined movement of target muscles can be easily controlled during data acquisition. By using MEG, two groups reported a contribution of cM1 in IM (Lang et al., 1996; Schnitzler et al., 1997) . By using dense-array electroencephalography (EEG), movement associated mu-and beta-rhythm was described over the primary sensorimotor area (Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 1997) . By using TMS during IM, increased excitability was observed over the contralateral motor cortex somatotopically related to muscles involved in this specific imagery task (Fadiga et al., 1994; Pascual Leone et al., 1995) .
PET measurements allow for a control of muscle activation with EMG without fMRI typical artefacts (Stephan et al., 1995; Naito et al., 1999) . However, most PET studies did not show significant activation in cM1 during IM (e.g. Roland et al., 1980; Decety et al., 1994 , Stephan et al., 1995 . There may be two reasons for these discrepant results and both are methodologically grounded. The first is the factor 'time'. It has been shown that cM1 activation during IM is shorter and smaller in magnitude than during ME (Kristeva et al., 2003) . Therefore, it can be easily detected by electrophysiological measurements but not by methods with poor temporal resolution (such as PET). Other factors are 'significance' and 'size of activation loci'. Activation magnitude and representation size is decreased during IM, so that methods with low spatial resolution fail to detect activation in M1.
One highly interesting PET study described significant activation in the contralateral BA 4a using an illusory arm extension after vibration on the biceps tendon (Naito et al., 1999) .
However, this is a quite different task than IM and since the vibration task involves BA 3a and 2 of the primary somatosensory cortex, it might automatically induce activation in the tightly anatomically and functionally associated motor neurons. One remarkable issue of this study is the usage of cytoarchitectural maps (Roland & Zilles, 1996) for imaging tasks nine years before this was applied in fMRI studies on IM.
The importance of training and instructions
Imagery may not be imagery: Which tasks are 'motor imagery' tasks?
In the previous section, an overview was provided concerning the somewhat conflicting results on M1 activation during IM. However, the recruitment of M1 during IM seems to depend on the specific instructions given for the imagery task, the training regimen for imagery, the experience of the subjects with imagery tasks, and the level of motor expertise in with the task that has to be imagined. In the following section, these issues will be elaborated on in further detail.
Instructions for Imagery Tasks possibly relating to Brain Activation
When reviewing the literature concerning MI, one problem is that many studies neglect provision of instructional details given to the participants when they were asked to imagine.
As imagery defies direct control by the experimenter (i.e., quantification of imagery content is not possible, but see Heremans et al., 2008 , for an approach in goal-directed movements), it is thus essential to constrain the imagery process by appropriate instructions. Additionally, it should be considered that these instructional differences might cause changes in motor cortical activation by varying the attentional focus on different aspects of motor control in participants. Solodkin et al. (2004) showed that visual and kinaesthetic imagery are based on differential neural substrates, as only IM, with its focus on kinaesthetic imagery contents, but not visual imagery involves M1. However, it seems that they compared the neural networks activated by the two forms of imagery within two independent groups (the first one performing visual imagery and the other one performing kinaesthetic imagery). In a better controlled study (Guillot et al., 2008b) provided evidence that the neural networks mediating these two forms of motor imagery were no totally overlapping in the same group of subjects with good to excellent IM abilities. Accordingly, they found that the "motor systems" were more strongly activated during visual than during kinaesthetic imagery. Most authors agree that movementrelated kinaesthetic sensations play a major role in the IM context. Instructions focusing on kinaesthetic contents of imagery ask subjects, for instance, to concentrate on how their limbs feel during moving. In many studies, subjects are also requested to imagine themselves moving, in order to facilitate kinaesthetic sensations. For the case that instructions for imagery are poorly reported in a study, it remains unclear which perspective participants adopt during imagery. There are many possibilities on a phenomenal level. Actions can be imagined as if oneself would act, i.e., adopting a first-person-perspective (1PP). When expert ski-runners mentally prepare for their race, they mostly adopt 1PP, focusing on kinaesthetic aspects during imagined skiing. In terms of somatosensory inputs, 1PP would refer to being within the acting body and experiencing oneself as the cause of the actions (being the 'agent'). In terms of visual inputs, 1PP resembles wearing a helmet camera and the ski-runners would 'see' their own body parts from a familiar viewpoint. This suggests that during MI, visual contents might be part of the imagery process, but the focus is on the kinaesthetic aspects. In contrast, third-person-perspective (3PP) imagery implies that other acting humans are the content of imagination, meaning they are agents of the actions. Here, the focus is clearly on the visual side. To complete the picture, it might also be that participants adopt a 3PP, but imagine themselves acting. From a theoretical point of view (see Vogeley & Fink, 2003) , it is noteworthy to keep this in mind as perspective does then not determine agency, i.e., one can imagine oneself from a 3PP and still experience oneself as the agent of an action (' I see myself doing the dishes').
Irrespective of perspective, self-generated actions are correctly predictable as anticipated sensory consequences and efference copy match perfectly and this notion might also apply to imagery processes. Feed-forward modelling helps to understand why most of the time, humans can successfully attribute the cause of actions (Wolpert et al., 1998) .
Visual imagery focuses on external aspects with special reference to the relation of body and environment, whereas IM highlights internal states of movement dynamics and force production, maybe explaining differential activation in motor areas.
Differences in IM Study Procedures
Some studies employ designs with motor execution phases so that participants engage in imagery after execution (e.g., Filimon et al., 2007) . Other studies use observation of the to-beimagined actions before imagery (e.g., Munzert et al., 2008) or even present visual stimuli during imagery (Iseki et al., 2008) . Additionally, in some studies participants perform imagery training phases (Hanakawa et al., 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2003) , in others, participants are chosen that report experience in mental rehearsal (Lotze et al., 2003) . The familiarity with the to-be-imagined actions and with the usage of motor imagery therefore greatly differs between imagery studies and it has to be acknowledged that different sources, related to memory processes, experienced kinaesthetic feedback, and others, are used to guide imagery.
To date, systematic approaches to study these issues are lacking, but it seems plausible that conflicting results are also related to these study-specific aspects.
Some early fMRI-studies used very simple motor tasks and found 30-50% precentral cortex activation contralateral to the effector hand during IM compared to ME (e.g. Leonardo et al., 1995; Lotze et al., 1999) . In some studies, subjects were trained to avoid EMG-responses of target muscles with EMG feedback (Lotze et al., 1999) . Thereby, ME and muscle contractions can be reduced stepwise and high imagination scores can be attained by the subjects. By this procedure, it is ensured that only subjects able to perform IM vividly and without overt movement are fMRI-scanned.
Other authors combined fMRI and TMS measurements in complex and simple imagined movements (Kuhtz-Buschbeck et al., 2003) and demonstrated that M1 is increasingly involved in more complex movements. This may support the hypothesis that M1 contribution to IM is intensity and threshold-dependent. A very recent fMRI study on IM clearly demonstrated that IM of complex finger movements involves M1 (Sharma et al., 2008) . Jackson (2001) summarized that "contrary to the conditions in which a motor task can be learned implicitly with physical practice, mental practice with IM requires that subjects have all the necessary declarative knowledge about the different components of the task before practicing. However, as with physical practice, the rehearsing of the task with IM can also give access to the non-conscious processes involved in learning the skilled behaviour." Jackson concluded that "internally driven images which promote the kinaesthetic feeling of movements would best activate the different non conscious processes involved during motor task training."
A great variety of different types of actions involving different body parts have been used to elucidate the neural substrates of imagery in fMRI studies; among them are singing (Kleber et al., 2007) , walking (Iseki et al., 2008) , gymnastic movements (Munzert et al., 2008) , finger tapping (Hanakawa et al., 2008) , moving fingers, toes, and tongue (Ehrsson et al., 2003) , object-related reaching (Filimon et al., 2007) , flexion of foot (Alkadhi et al., 2005; Cramer et al., 2005) or Tango steps (Sacco et al., 2006) . Some use familiar objects participants need to act upon (Ruby & Decety, 2001 ); other studies employ non-object movements (Naito et al., 2002) .
Albeit all these mentioned actions seem rather different, they nevertheless are alike in terms of how imagery is instructed explicitly and that they can be voluntarily controlled by the participants. In many studies, participants even self-trigger their imagination and indicate by button presses start and end of the imagination. By this, mental chronometry can be used as an indirect manipulation check (see Bruzzo et al., 2007 , for a behavioural study and Sharma et al., 2008 for an fMRI study). It should be noted, however, that the term 'motor imagery' is also used for studies employing tasks in which imagery is suggested to be used implicitly, for instance, when action-related words are read (Tomasino et al., 2007) , when body parts need to be rotated (Sharma et al., 2008) , or when participants simulate manual rotation of objects to decide whether two objects are identical (Lamm et al., 2007) . In implicit imagery paradigms, participants are not explicitly instructed to imagine these actions, they are asked to solve a task which implies motor simulation processes. Some participants in these studies might indeed use a simulation strategy, i.e., using their own motor representations to solve the task, whereas others may not, and controlling participant's compliance is a methodological issue here as well. The contribution of M1 in these studies (see also de Lange et al., 2007) could not be shown. In a recent study, Guillot et al. (2008) selected only those 13 subjects out of a preinvestigated group of 50 healthy subjects for the imagery task who were able achieve an imagery score more than one standard deviation higher than the average of the group. Other chapters in this book are dealing with the appropriate scores on imagery capabilities.
Latest studies combine many measures: scores in imagery, behavioural measures such as imagery time in relation to execution time, and physiological variables such as autonomic responses during imagery and execution (Guillot et al., 2008a and b) . This will certainly help to understand what subjects are actually doing when they are instructed to imagine a motor task.
Motor experience and its Influence on Motor Imagery
As the behavioural literature provides some hints that the use of the imagery mode is affected by motor expertise (Hardy & Callow, 1999) , it is also plausible to argue that motor-system activation during imagery might depend on refined motor representations. The latter should be 'stored' in an expert-specific format because extensive practice requires the motor system to relate sensory signals and motor commands permanently. However, it is controversial whether this depends on altered M1 activation in IM, as some studies do not find M1 and the primary auditory cortex in musicians.
As noted above, highly influential models in motor control provide a framework how this might be accomplished (Wolpert et al., 2003 ). An inverse model generates an appropriate motor command and the forward model maps the efference copy with the anticipated outcome of the action. It builds a template against which the incoming information (reafferences) can be compared. Normally, there is little discrepancy between the anticipated outcome and the real sensory feedback in moving. However, sometimes greater discrepancies require the rapid adjustment of the motor command and, on this basis, again on the anticipated consequences of actions. While in the past, computational models have been mainly used as simulator tools to investigate small-range motor actions (such as reaching and grasping movements), they have now also been adapted for social interaction and other processes that might need hidden states of action (as motor imagery, see also Jeannerod, 2001 ). Behavioural studies have initially shown that kinaesthetic signals matter in imagery processes because incompatible postural signals affect implicit and explicit imagery (Parsons, 1994; Sirigu & Duhamel, 2001; Funk et al., 2005; Ionta et al., 2007) . In imaging studies, it could also be demonstrated that imagined and actual body position influence the activity in neural structures during own-body simulation processes (de Lange et al., 2006) . These results suggest that the plastic and dynamic representation of spatial and biomechanical properties of the body, derived from highly redundant multiple sensory inputs caused by physical practice, are involved in imagery. Therefore, modulation of neural activity by kinaesthetic feedback suggests that it particularly matters in simulating oneself, especially for experts. Guillot et al. (2008b) compared good versus bad imagers, selected by imagery scores (ANSscore, MIQ-score, auto-estimation score, mental chronometry score) and autonomic measures (skin conductance during execution and imagery), during kinaesthetic imagery of a finger sequence task of their left hand. They found significant contralateral M1 activation only in the poor imagers but not in the good imagers. It might be that good imagers do not recruit M1 during IM, a finding which fits nicely to reports on specialized imagers such as musicians (Lotze et al., 2003) .
IM-Training
Mental practice improves performance in athletes (Driskell et al. 1994) . Roure et al. (1999) showed a positive correlation between rating of the quality of imagery using changes in autonomic measures such as heart rate, skin temperature and skin resistance and the improvement in performance of volleyball. There are two chapters dealing with this issue in this book (Guillot et In training of musical performance a period of five days of both IM and ME resulted in an increase of cM1 map size of the long finger flexors/extensors as assessed with TMS (Pascual- Leone et al., 1995) . Subjects with the executed training displayed a greater increase in performance, but IM resulted also in a training effect. Most interestingly the IM group demonstrated the same training effect after one additional ME training session as the ME group pointing to the importance of combining IM and ME in musical performance training. 
Motor therapy with IM and the impact on primary motor cortex activation and performance
Since the activation in the contralateral primary motor hand area is the best predictor for motor outcome of the hand function after lesion of the brain (Lotze et al., 2006B) , an early access of M1 with IM training would be highly important especially for patients who cannot execute movements due to complete plegia of the hand muscles. We tested an fMRI-based feedback training of M1-activation by imagery techniques (see Fig. 2 ). Together with BOLDfeedback, an activation in M1 without motor execution could be easily accomplished as demonstrated here. However, it is not clear whether an increased access to M1 as established by feedback does really transfer to motor functioning in these patients. The value of both motor imagery (Butler et al. 2006 ; in Arch Phys Med) and motor observation training for motor function improvement after stroke has been demonstrated recently (Ertelt et al., 2007) and this technically less demanding method might be a useful complementary therapy approach for these patients.
Conclusions
1. The primary motor cortex is involved in dependence on the imagery task 2. Imagery tasks have to be trained but also described and controlled carefully shown. On the right, the top graph shows the BOLD-time course for the ROI (cM1) and the medial those for the reference area (SMA). The bottom graph indicates movement of the head in mm and rotations in degrees (each for 3 directions). This subject showed considerable problems with imagery intensity during training without fMRI (vividness 2 of a maximum of 6), but he was perfectly able to increase BOLD-magnitude by fMRI-visual feedback with a temporal delay of 5 seconds in average.
